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Abstract
The Large Hadron Collider (LHC), once in operation, will rep-
resent approximately a 200-fold increase in stored beam energy
with respect to previous high energy colliders. Safe operation
will critically rely on machine and experiment protection sys-
tems. A review is given of possible beam failure modes at the
LHC and of the strategy adopted in the LHC experiments to
protect the detectors against such events. Damage limits for the
detectors are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proton momentum (7 TeV/c) and intensity (2808
bunches of each 1.15×1011 protons/bunch) at the CERN Large
Hadron Collider (LHC [1]) will be such that the total energy
stored in one beam, 360 MJ, will be more than two orders of
magnitude above the maximum beam energy stored in previous
high energy colliders, like TEVATRON and HERA. Even during
injection into the LHC, at 450 GeV, the energy stored in a single
nominal batch of protons (288 bunches) will be 2.4 MJ, i.e. in
excess of the maximum energy stored in a TEVATRON proton
beam (1.5 MJ) or in a HERA proton beam (2 MJ). Equipment
damage potential also relates to the energy density of the beam.
In this respect, considering the small LHC beam dimensions,
the maximum energy density will be about a factor 1000 higher
than for other accelerators. To cope with these extreme condi-
tions, a robust machine protection system has been developed
for the LHC machine [2].
Past experience with beam accidents in particle physics de-
tectors, particularly in vertex detectors, teach us that experi-
ments should implement a dedicated experiment protection sys-
tem against beam failures. At the LHC, beyond relying on pas-
sive machine protection elements (absorbers and collimators),
the experiments will have (i) a stand-alone protection system
capable of detecting potentially harmful beam conditions and,
when required, triggering a beam abort on the appropriate time
scale, (ii) the capability to inhibit injection into the LHC ma-
chine, and (iii) the means to monitor particle rates in the exper-
iment during injection and stop the process if necessary.
The purpose of this article is to give an overview of exper-
iment protection at the LHC. Section II describes the general
LHC layout. Because the machine protection system constitutes
the bulk and first line of defense of LHC experiment protection,
we outline in section III its general strategy and principal fea-
tures (a more detailed and more expert description can be found
in Ref. [1, 2, 3]). Section IV briefly reviews possible beam fail-
ure scenari. In section V we describe the main features of the
experiment protection systems. The special case of movable de-
tectors is covered in section VI, while in section VII we discuss
the damage potential of LHC beams. Finally, section VIII gives
a summary and outlook.
II. THE LHC MACHINE AND EXPERIMENTS
Figure 1: Schematic top view of the LHC (courtesy Rudiger Schmidt,
CERN). Beam 1 (clockwise) and beam 2 (anticlockwise) are injected
in IR2 and IR8 and both are extracted in IR6. Note that IR1 and IR5
are also hosting forward detector experiments, LHCf [5] and TOTEM
[7] respectively (not indicated on the figure).
Figure 1 shows the general layout of the LHC which is di-
vided in eight octants joined by eight insertion regions (IR).
Four of these insertion regions (IR1, IR2, IR5 and IR8) are
traversing experimental areas. The RF system for beam ac-
celeration is located in IR4. The clockwise beam (beam 1) is
injected near interaction point 2 (IP2), while the anticlockwise
beam (beam 2) is injected near IP8. Apart from a few specific
collimators, the collimation system is implemented in IR3 (for
momentum cleaning) and IR7 (for betatron cleaning). Beam ex-
traction is implemented in IR6. Figure 2 shows the layout of two
insertion regions. The top figure displays the IR5 layout, similar
to IR1, while the bottom figure shows the IR8 layout, similar to
IR2. ATLAS [4] and LHCf [5] are installed around IP1, which
can be rated the safest of all interacton points in terms of possi-
ble beam failure scenari. CMS [6] and TOTEM [7] are located
at IP5, one arc away from the beam dump section in IR6. AL-
ICE [8] and LHCb [9] are hosted in IR2 and IR8 which are the
regions of beam injection, beam 1 and beam 2 respectively, just
about 200 m away from the IP. Furthermore, ALICE and LHCb
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each have a dipole spectrometer magnet in the experiment and
three compensator magnets deviating the beams in the vertical
plane (for ALICE) and ring plane (for LHCb). Finally, ATLAS
and CMS have so-called TAS absorbers, which are 1.8 m long
copper blocks situated at ±19 m from the IP. These are needed
to protect the inner triplet of cryogenic quadrupoles around the
IP from the excessive heat load due to particles from proton-
proton collisions. Accessorily, the TAS absorbers also protect
the inner detectors of ATLAS and CMS from a variety of beam
failures. Due to the lower design luminosity of ALICE and
LHCb, the inner triplets in IR2 and IR8 do not require such pro-
tection. The different configurations in each experimental area
imply that, beyond beam failure scenari common to all, some
experiments will be more exposed to specific beam failures.
III. MACHINE PROTECTION AND BEAM
INTERLOCK SYSTEM
The LHC machine protection system has been described in
great details in Ref. [2] and references therein. It relies on both
passive and active protection. The former is based on aper-
ture limitation and dilution/absorption of beam losses (by col-
limators, absorbers, diluters). The latter implements fast detec-
tion of problem conditions (beam loss and beam position mon-
itors, quench detectors, etc.) and fast beam extraction (LHC
beam dumping system or LBDS). At the LHC, about 85% of
the 27 km of the ring circumference is composed of supercon-
ducting magnets operated at 1.9 or 4.5 K. The combination of a
large stored energy in the beams and a massive usage of cryo-
genic superconducting magnets requires a sophisticated colli-
mation system with unprecedented performance [1, 10]. In con-
trast to other machines such as HERA, RHIC and TEVATRON,
the LHC machine cannot be operated without collimation, be-
cause of the tight quench margins1. This by itself will ensure
a significant level of safety for the experiments: the collimators
must define the aperture at all times. For an assumed beam loss
lifetime of 10 h, the collimation system must catch with 99.9%
probability the particles that would otherwise be lost on sensi-
tive items, such as the cold aperture (superconducting magnets)
or the detectors around the interaction points.
Figure 2: Layout of two insertion regions, IR5 (top) and IR8 (bottom). Warm magnets are indicated in red (MBXW, MBXWS, MKI, MSI, MQI,
MBI), cold magnets in light blue (MQXA, MQXB, MBRC, MQY, MQML, MBX, MQM/L, MQM, MBA). Yellow elements indicate absorbers
(TAS, TAN) or collimators (TDI). XRP1 & XRP2 show the positions of the TOTEM Roman Pot stations. Distances are shown in meters.
A sketch of the beam interlock system (BIS) is shown in
Fig. 3. Two redundant optical loops per beam transport so-
called BeamPermit signals around the ring. Each pair of loops is
composed of a clockwise and anticlockwise propagating signal
loop. Two beam interlock controllers (BIC) per insertion region
are used to make a logical And of a number of logical signals
provided by the users (UserPermit signals). When a UserPermit
signal is set False, then the BeamPermit is removed (the opti-
cal signal loops interrupted), which fires the dump system and
blocks injection from the Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS). For
example, beam loss monitors and beam position monitors may
detect abnormal conditions and fire a beam dump, or quench
protection sensors may detect a developing quench and fire a
beam dump. In total, there will be several thousand LHC de-
vices with input to a BIC, which imposes severe availability and
reliability levels2 [11]. The LHC beam dump system, described
in Ref. [1], relies on at least 14 out of 15 kicker magnets firing
to extract a beam. The kick amplitude is coupled to an energy
tracking system which ensures that beams are properly extracted
at any energy [2]. Every beam filling scheme contains an abort
1The quench levels for slow, continuous losses are expected to be approximately 7× 108 protonsm−1 s−1 at 450 GeV and 7.6× 106 protonsm−1 s−1 at
7 TeV [1].
2A fraction of these user inputs may be masked under specific conditions.
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gap of at least 3 μs in the bunch structure, corresponding to the
dump kicker rise time. The abort gap in each beam is tracked
and monitored. Each beam has an independent dump system.
When fired by the BIS, the extraction of the full beam is com-
pleted within less than 270 μs from the removal of the UserPer-
mit signal at the BIC.
Figure 3: Sketch of the LHC beam interlock system based on optical
loops around the ring (extracted from [3], courtesy Rudiger Schmidt,
CERN). Explanation in the text.
IV. BEAM FAILURES
Beam failures can occur on different time scales. Slow,
steady losses resulting from beam degradation on the time scale
of seconds or minutes may damage the detectors, for instance
by increased radiation dose, but do not necessarily require an
automated beam abort (recovery of good beam conditions may
be attempted). On the contrary, faster losses require rapid, au-
tomated reaction via the BIS. For example, beam losses due to
a tripping magnet will generally develop on the time scale of
several turns3 (for warm magnets) to several milliseconds (for
superconducting magnets). Ultra-fast losses, on the time scale
of one turn or less, are tackled by passive protection. Such losses
are due to e.g. an injection failure or a beam extraction failure.
A. Failures with circulating beams
A large class of beam failure scenari involves circulating
beams (at any energy), where beam degradation may be due to
a magnet failure or wrong change of settings, to an RF failure,
to a collimator failure or wrong change of settings, etc. In these
cases beam perturbations will generally affect a large portion of
the ring and therefore are likely to be detected by the machine
protection system before experiments are affected. An excep-
tion to this are possible faults in local bumps, which may affect
a single IR with minimal effects outside the local bump region.
In this respect, vertex detectors in ALICE and LHCb may be
more exposed than those in ATLAS and CMS, as TAS absorbers
(for the latter experiments) could help limiting direct hit or high
rate splashes to the innermost silicon detectors. A recent study
of such type of failures has been reported in Ref. [12].
B. Beam failures at injection
Another class of failures involves beams at injection. Here,
an incomplete or unsynchronized kicker fire or wrong magnet
settings in the transfer line could detrimentally affect ALICE or
LHCb. Wrong magnet settings in the LHC, in particular in any
of the experimental IRs (e.g. D1 magnet, see Fig. 2), could
cause local damage and affect only the experiment of that par-
ticular IR. At 450 GeV, wrong magnet settings can potentially
produce much larger deviations on the beam than at top energy.
Again, the absence of TAS absorbers and the presence of spec-
trometer/corrector magnets in ALICE and LHCb may render
these two experiments more prone and/or more exposed to such
beam failures. A recent study shows how various wrong magnet
settings can direct the beam in the vicinity of the ALICE and
LHCb experiments [13, 14]. The results of these studies will be
used to set software interlocks on a number of critical magnets
around the IRs.
To mitigate the risk for this class of failures, a number of
movable and fixed absorbers are placed upstream of the experi-
ments [15]. Furthermore, injection into an empty LHC ring will
always start with a single bunch of low intensity, in order to
probe at once the settings of all static beam-steering elements
of the machine and transfer line and/or to detect unexpected
aperture limitations. Once circulating beam is established, in-
jection of high intensity batches may proceed. This procedure
is enforced by interlocks [16]. Circulating beam current will be
measured in each LHC ring by beam current transformers that
will set True an interlock flag (the BeamPresence flags, one per
ring) if the measured current is at least 5 μA (≈ 2.8×109 stored
protons). In the SPS injector a similar device sets a flag (Probe-
Beam flag) which determines whether the prepared beam batch
is safe for injection, i.e. whether it is below a certain predefined
intensity limit. If this flag is False, then beam transfer from SPS
to LHC can only occur if the BeamPresence flag is set True.
If ProbeBeam is True, beam transfer can occur irrespective of
the BeamPresence flag value. Defining an acceptable value of
the safe limit for beam transfer requires a broad understanding
of all possible risks involved, for machine equipment as well as
for the experiments. This value is currently set to 1010 protons
and could be configured to a maximum of 1011 protons under
special conditions.
C. Beam failures at extraction
Finally, a class of failures involves beam extraction. A rele-
vant failure of the extraction system for experiments (especially
in IR5) is a possible unsynchronized beam abort (kicker pre-
fire). In such a case, a number of bunches may be swept during
the kicker rise time. Of these bunches, up to 24 may continue
their trajectory in the ring, possibly creating large intantaneous
losses (mostly caught by collimators). Such beam failures could
occur about once per year.
Early simulation studies showed that the IP5 inner triplet and
CMS could be severly affected by a kicker pre-fire event [17].
As a consequence of this study, additionnal protective absorbers
3One LHC turn is about 89 μs.
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were added around IR6 in order to largely reduce the impact of
such extraction failures [18, 19].
V. LHC EXPERIMENT PROTECTION SYSTEMS
The individual LHC experiment protection systems will be
centered on diamond-based beam conditions monitors (BCM),
a feature common to ALICE, ATLAS, CMS4 and LHCb. Ad-
ditionnal detectors may participate in the experiment protec-
tion system, such as scintillator counters in the case of CMS or
C˘erenkov counters in ATLAS. The most exposed TOTEM de-
tectors, the Roman Pots, will rely on nearby LHC beam loss
monitors for protection [20]. Here, we limit our discussion
to the diamond BCM. We outline the general picture of the
BCM systems, emphasizing commonality, and refer the reader
to the bibliography for the details of each individual BCM
[21, 22, 23, 24].
Polycrystalline CVD5 diamond pads have been selected as
the primary sensors of LHC experiment protection for their
compactness, simplicity, reliability and radiation resistance.
Such sensors have been successfully used at other high en-
ergy physics experiments (BABAR [25], BELLE, CDF [26] and
ZEUS). BCM diamond pads for LHC experiments were devel-
opped first within the RD42 collaboration for ATLAS and CMS
and subsequently ported to LHCb and ALICE. For a recent re-
view of diamond detectors in high energy physics applications
see Ref. [27].
The LHC experiment beam conditions monitors are gener-
ally composed of an array of diamond pads located in the vicin-
ity of the beams, typically 4 or 8 diamond sensors on each side
of the IP. Each sensor is about 1 × 1 cm2 in size and 0.3 to
0.5 mm thick. Some selected characteristics of the diamond
BCM systems of LHC experiments are listed in table 1. Indica-
tively, the average primary flux of minimum-ionizing particles
(MIP) per diamond pad at r ≈ 4 cm (radius from beam axis)
and z ≈ 2m (longitudinal distance from IP) are expected to be
in the order of 0.05 per inelastic proton-proton interaction, at
14 TeV center of mass energy.
The BCM systems will be operated stand-alone with a ded-
icated readout chain. The readout schemes and speeds differ
from experiment to experiment. As shown in table 1, some sys-
tems integrate over ∼ 40μs, others implement bunch-by-bunch
rate capability (25 ns readout speed) which also allows moni-
toring beam halo by timing. All systems use an FPGA-based
readout board to process the data and generate a decision. The
detailed algorithms and threshold definitions are specific to each
experiment. The experiment protection systems will dump both
beams when generating a beam abort.
Table 1: Selected characteristics of CVD diamond beam conditions monitors of LHC experiments.
Experiment System Diamond Radial distance Longitudinal Readout Ref.
pads from beam line distances from IP frequency
ALICE BCM-A1 4 15 cm - +4.5 m 40 μs [21]
BCM-A2 4 6 cm - +13.5 m 40 μs
BCM-C 8 8 cm -19 m - 40 μs
ATLAS BCM 4 per side 5.5 cm -1.83 m +1.83 m 25 ns [22]
BLM 6 per side 6.5 cm -3.45 m +3.45 m 40 μs
CMS BCM1L 4 per side 4.5 cm -1.8 m +1.8 m 5 μs [23]
BCM2 12 per side 4.5 and 29 cm -14.4 m +14.4 m 40 μs
LHCb BCM-U 8 3 cm -2 m - 40 μs [24]
BCM-D 8 3.1 cm - +2.8 m 40 μs
Given the fact that all experiment will use a non-maskable
input to the local BIC, the LHC machine will not operate if any
of the experiment UserPermit signals is missing. This imposes
strong availability requirements on the experiment protection
system, in particular the BCM, which is required to be ready
from the first day of LHC operation. The experiment protection
systems are required to implement post-mortem data retrieval
and analysis that allows reconstructing a posteriori the few mil-
liseconds preceding any beam abort.
In general, the primary purpose of the BCM systems is
to protect the experiments against circulating beam failures.
Nonetheless, the experiments are considering the use of BCM
systems and others detectors to monitor possible abnormal rates
at all times, in particular during injection, to generate a feed-
back warning for the experiment and LHC control rooms and/or
to inhibit further injection if necessary.
VI. THE SPECIAL CASE OF MOVABLE DETECTORS
Several experiments will make use of movable detectors in
the LHC machine. These require special interlock functional-
ity in order to reduce the risk of beam damage when the de-
tectors are in the closed position for physics. TOTEM will use
silicon strip detectors in pairs of Roman Pot devices located at
z ≈ ±147m and z ≈ ±220m from IP5 [7]. These Roman Pots
consist of movable vacuum enclosures that enable bringing the
silicon sensors to a distance of 1.2 mm from the beam. ATLAS
will implement scintillating fiber detectors in a similar configu-
ration in IR1 [28], though not before the year 2010. The LHCb
vertex locator (VELO [29]) at IP8, composed of 42 silicon strip
modules mounted in the vacuum, is also a movable detector. It
is divided in two halves (left and right of the beams) that can be
retracted sideways by 30 mm during LHC filling. The 21 VELO
4The TOTEM trackers T1 and T2, are mechanically integrated in CMS and protected by the CMS BCM [20].
5Chemical vapor deposition.
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modules of each half are enclosed in a thin-walled Aluminium
box (250 μm) that separates the beam vacuum from the detector
vacuum. In nominal physics operation the silicon detectors will
be precisely positioned around the colliding beams and the box
material will approach the beams to a mere 5 mm distance (the
silicon edges reaching a radial distance of about 7 mm).
Because of the expected beam excursions during beam fill-
ing and preparation for physics, all movable detectors are re-
quired to be in the retracted (or garage) position during these
operations. Beam modes have been defined to characterize the
operational states. Interlock flags derived from the beam modes
will be transmitted to the experiment protection systems for con-
ditioning their interlocks. One particular flag will signal when
movable detectors are allowed to leave their garage position. If
this flag is set False and a movable detector is not in garage po-
sition, then the experiment protection system will fire a beam
dump. Furthermore, whenever a movable detector is not in
garage position the corresponding experiment will inhibit injec-
tion from the SPS.
Protection of movable detectors critically relies on the ex-
periment or machine protection systems (BCM or BLM). A lo-
cal excursion of a circulating beam, or a failure in the motion
system of a movable detector, may dangerously bring the beam
envelope in overlap with the detector enclosure or other nearby
elements. The motion systems are too slow to react on such
eventualities. Therefore, these abnormal conditions must be de-
tected by the BCM (or BLM) and instantly lead to a beam dump
trigger.
VII. DAMAGE POTENTIAL OF LHC BEAM
FAILURES
All vertex detectors and most inner trackers at LHC experi-
ments are based on silicon technology. Beam-induced damage
for silicon detectors may have different causes, among which:
heat deposition, radiation damage and charge-induced break-
down.
• Heat deposition: A crude estimate6 suggests that an instan-
taneous rate of R ≈ 1013 protons/cm2 will not increase
the local temperature of silicon by more than a few degrees
(neglecting particle showering in the silicon). Given the
lightness of silicon vertex detectors and the assumed beam
failure scenari, heat-induced damage to silicon seems un-
likely, although thermal shock effects have not been con-
sidered in details for the LHC detectors.
• Radiation damage: Incurred displacement damage will eat
up the radiation dose budget. However, silicon detectors at
LHC experiments are designed to sustain fluences7 of up to
several 1014 neq/cm2, corresponding to an absorbed dose
of about 10Mrad. Example studies by ALICE [30] and AT-
LAS [31] indicate that, given the assumed scenari and oc-
curence probabilities, increased radiation dose due to beam
failures is not expected to significantly cut down the de-
tector life time. Nonetheless, all experiments will carry
out detailed monitoring of radiation fluences, so that min-
imization of radiation damage may be attempted by beam
tuning.
• Charge-induced breakdown: Sudden high rate may dras-
tically change the electric field configuration in silicon,
which locally becomes conductive, and possibly destroy
local features of the sensors, depending on the technol-
ogy used. For example, the bias voltage may be moved to
across a silicon oxide dieletric layer between strip implant
and readout strip. The silicon oxide layer breaks down at
about 1 V/nm and thus, depending on the particle rate, the
sensor may be locally damaged (e.g. production of pin
holes). A direct hit to front-end integrated circuits may
cause even greater damage, as the loss of a readout chip
generally implies the loss of many detector channels.
The damage potential of an LHC beam for bulk inactive ma-
terial has been studied by simulations and cross-calibrated with
a controlled experiment at injection energy [32]. SPS batches
of increasing intensity were directed into a stack target of se-
lected materials. The result of these studies were found in rea-
sonable agreement with simulations (at the 30% level) and in-
dicated that, for copper, the melting point was reached at about
2.4 × 1012 protons and clear damage became visible at about
4.8 × 1012 protons. These studies led to a definition of the
SafeBeam value for LHC equipment at injection energy (1012
protons) and, based on simulation, at top energy (1010 protons).
Below this value, the number of active inputs to the BIS may be
relaxed by masking specific inputs.
Concerning silicon detectors, high particle rate tests were
performed at the CERN Proton Synchrotron (PS) with batches
of 24 GeV bunches by ATLAS [33] and CMS [34]. Proton
bunches8 were directed onto silicon detector modules, with peak
bunch densities in the order of 3× 1010 protons/cm2. The de-
tectors were under bias and the front-end electronics were kept
under voltage. Both groups concluded that LHC beam losses
producing particle rates of up to 3×1010 protons/cm2 in about
40 ns would not cause irreversible damage to the studied silicon
detectors, although a reset of the front-end electronics may be
required. Furthermore, laboratory tests were carried out to in-
fer from the response to laser beam pulses the damage potential
of high MIP rates on ATLAS silicon strip detectors under bias
[35]. Damage to aluminium readout strips was observed at laser
pulse densities corresponding to rates of the order of 109 MIP
in 6 ns injected in a single strip (thus, on a surface area smaller
than 0.1 mm2).
More recently, LHCb has carried out a high rate test at the
CERN PS Booster, exposing a VELO module to particle rates
ranging from 2.5 to 9000× 109 protons/bunch with a beam spot
size of the order of 1 cm2 and bunch length ∼ 100 ns. The
detector was tested with high voltage bias on and off, and with
front-end electronics turned on and off (in all possible combi-
nations). The beam was sent perpendicular to the sensor plane
in various places of the sensors and directly on the electronic
6ΔT ≈ (1.66 MeV cm2/g) ·R/Cp = 3.8 K, with a specific heat of silicon Cp ≈ 0.7 J g−1 K−1.
7Equivalent non-ionizing energy loss: 1neq = 1 MeV neutron equivalent displacement damage in silicon.
8Bunch length 42 ns , bunch intensity 1011 protons and bunch separation of 256 ns.
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readout chips. No obvious damage was obsreved and the detec-
tor was fully operational at the end of the high rate test. More
details can be found in Ref. [36].
Quite generally, detector components in the experiments, in
particular close to the beam line, such as silicon sensors, might
not be as sturdy as machine equipment. Although the actual
damage limits (in terms of MIP cm−2ns−1) of silicon detec-
tors used in LHC experiments is yet unclear, recent experience
with TEVATRON or LEP experiments [37] would suggest re-
ducing the limit for ProbeBeam to the lowest possible value.
However, LHC beam instrumentation is limited in sensitivity,
which precludes efficient machine studies at intensities below
about 3 × 109 protons. In addition, dealing with bunches of
such small intensity may require time costly adjustements in the
injector chain. Therefore, a trade-off value for the ProbeBeam
flag has been found, which soundly balances experiment protec-
tion and machine operation efficiency.
VIII. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In summary, with the Large Hadron Collider a new domain
for stored beam energy is entered which imposes extreme re-
quirements on machine and experiment protection. The instal-
lation of these protection systems is completed and commission-
ing is well advanced.
The damage risk for silicon vertex detectors depends on the
detailed design of the sensors (pixels versus strips, p-in-n versus
n-in-n, AC versus DC coupling, geometry, etc.) which broadly
varies across LHC experiments. It may as well depend on the
state of the detector (value of silicon bias voltage, state of front-
end chip supply voltage, etc.). A detailed characterization of
the most exposed detectors in each experiment and good under-
standing of the risks associated with possible beam failures can
lead to a better policy of operation of these detectors when the
LHC is not in stable beam conditions. For instance, the advan-
tages of detector stability (no charge up effects, no temperature
excursions, etc., when all voltages are kept on at all times) will
have to be weighed against a possible risk increase for the de-
tectors in situations where beams are not ready for physics.
Further detector tests and beam failure simulation studies
help refining the operation policy of the machine and detectors,
and defining initial dump thresholds, especially during the beam
commissioning phase.
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